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There seems little doubt that the distribution of wealth in
Britain is highly concentrated; however, while this has been widely
accepted, there has been remarkably little research in recent years
to determine the degree of inequality with precision. The only
statistics published for the 1 960s are those prepared by the Inland
Revenue, and these do not set out to cover the entire distribution.
Moreover, no attempt has been made to reconcile these estimates
with the National Balance Sheet data. This lack of interest is the
more surprising in view of the fact that the estate method was
pioneered in Britain, and that in the past there have been major
studies of the size distribution of wealth by (among others) Clay
[I], Daniels and Campion [2], Campion [3], Langley [41,[51,
andLydall and Tipping [6].
This paper describes the. first results of a new investigation
intended to provide more reliable estimates of the distribution of
wealth in Britain in the 1960s.1 The estimates presented here are
based on the estate duty returns, but are adjusted in a number of
major respects to take account of the deficiencies of this source.
The paper builds on the work of earlier investigators, but departs
from them in its extensive use of National Balance Sheet data
In preparing the revised version of this paper, I have been greatly helped
by the comments of the discussant, as well as by the detailed criticism of the
Statistics and Intelligence Division, Inland Revenue.
1Theresearch is being undertaken at the University of Essex by Alan
Harrison and myself and is supported by the Social Science Research Council.
The full results of the study will be reported in a forthcoming monograph,
The Distribution of Wealth in' Great Britain, to which the reader is referred
for further details.
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which were not previously available and in its analysis of the
sensitivity of the results to the different assumptions made.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section I describes the
estate duty method as presently employed by the Inland Revenue
and examines the principal problems connected with this ap-
proach. Section II sets out the alternative approach to the use of
the estate duty data adopted in this paper and presents new
estimates on a more comprehensive basis for the year 1968.
Section III examines the shape of the wealth distribution indicated
by the estimates and the extent to which it may be represented by
particular functions such as the Pareto and log-normal distribu-
tions. Section IV compares the estimates presented here with
those prepared by the Inland Revenue and summarizes the main
results.
I. THE ESTATE DUTY METHOD AND THE INLAND
REVENUE STATISTICS
The estate duty method has a long history and was used by
Baxter to estimate total personal wealth as early as 1869. Since
then,the method has been refined, notably by the use of
age-related multipliers pioneered by Mallet [81, and has been
applied to the estimation of the size distribution of wealth by Clay
[1] and subsequent writers. This section examines the use which
has been made of this method in recent years by the Inland
Revenue.
Since 1961, the Inland Revenue has published estimates of the
distribution of wealth based on the estate duty method. As a
result we now have an "official" series for the wealth distribution
for the years The Gini coefficients published by the
Inland Revenue indicate that wealth in Britain is highly concen-
trated: in 1968, for example, the coefficient was .68, which is over
twice that for the distribution of income.3 As the Inland Revenue
recognizes, however, there are a number of major problems with
the use of estate duty data and, as a result, their estimates may
provide an incomplete picture of the distribution of wealth in
Britain. The most serious of these problems are described below.
2
See,for example, Inland Revenue Statistics, 1972, Table 86.
See Stark [9].It should be noted that the wealth data relates to
individuals, whereas the income data relates to tax units. This is unlikely,
however, to explain this very large difference.Distribution of Wealth in Britain279
A. Incomplete Coverage of Estates— "Missing"People
The estate duty data covers only those estates which come to
the notice of the estate duty office and, as a result, over half the
estates are not included. Those omitted are those cases where no
property has been left, or where the estate is not liable for estate
duty4 and the assets are of a type which may be transferred
without probate: (1) property to which title can pass by delivery:
e.g. cash, personal possessions, and household goods; (2) property
where the owner can nominate a person to whom the asset should
be transferred:e.g.industrial life assurance policies; and (3)
property covered by statutory exemptions (Administration of
Estates [Small Payments] Act, 1965)—e.g., sums up to £500 held
in National Savings, buildings societies, cooperative societies and
friendly societies. It is clear from this list that none of the people
excluded from the Inland Revenue estimates are likely to possess
large amounts of wealth; the wealth holders who are missing from
the official estimates almost certainly belong to the lowest ranges.
In the main part of its work, the Inland Revenue makes no
allowance for these "missing" wealth holders: the Gini coefficients
q.uoted earlier, for example, are based only on those covered by
the returns. In its most recent report, the Inland Revenue has
presentedasecondsetof Gini coefficients, based on the
alternative extreme assumption that the remainder of the popula-
tion has no wealth atall.As one would expect, the Gini
coefficients are considerably higher: .87 in 1968, as opposed to .68.
However, neither of these extreme assumptions is adequate for our
purposes. To ignore the existence of half the adult population is
clearly wrong, but at the same time, it is not reasonable to suppose
that they possess no wealth at all. It is therefore necessary to
investigate more closely the possible wealth of those who do not
appear in the Inland Revenue's tables. An attempt to do this was
made by Lydall and Tipping [6], who based their estimates for
the whole population on the extrapolation (apparently by eye) of
the estate duty data below the exemption limit, and on the results
of the 1954 Oxford savings survey.5 Since the savings survey has
The exemption level was £3,000 at the beginning of the 1960s. It was
increased to £4,000 in 1962, £5,000 in 1963, and £10,000 in 1969.
Adjustments for the wealth of this group were also made by earlier
writers, but since the estate duty exemption limit was very much lower
until 1946) the amounts involved were smaller.280A.B.Atkinson
not been repeated,. the second of these approaches is not open to
us;6 we do, however, have available the National Balance Sheet
data used by Revell [10], which allow us to form an estimate of
the likely holdings of the missing population. This balance-sheet
approach wil provide the main basis for the estimates described
below, but in Section III we consider the alternative approach of
estimating the holding of lower wealth groups by extrapolating
wealth distributions fitted to the upper ranges.
B. Incomplete Coverage of Wealth— "Missing" Wealth
In addition to the wealth of those not covered by the Inland
Revenuestatistics,thereareotherimportant elements of
"missing" wealth, which arise from the provisions in the estate
duty law allowing wealth to be transferred in certain circum-
stances without duty being paid. As itis put by the Inland
Revenue, "certain elements are omitted because no duty is
payable on them either because of special exemptions or because
theyfalloutside the scope of estate duty law." The most
important items excluded are: (1) property settled on a surviving
spouse (who has no power to dispose of the capital), which is
exempt on the death of this spouse; (2) property held under
discretionary trusts (exempt before the 1969 Finance Act); (3)
items treated as estates by themselves, which do not appear if they
do not exceed the exemption limit;7 (4) growing timber, which is
not aggregated with the rest of the estate and on which duty is not
paid until the timber is sold; and (5) assets such as annuities and
pensions, which disappear death.
The Inland Revenue makes no attempt to adjust its estimates
for this missing wealth, and as a result, the levels of wealth may be
seriously understated. In their estimates for 1954, Lydall and
Tipping made some very approximate adjustments and added to
their total of £40,000 million for personal wealth, a further
£2,000 million for pension funds, £3,000 million for property
settled on a surviving spouse, and £1,000 million for discretionary
6Althoughit is hoped that at a later stage in the investigation we may be
able to make use of data collected by Professors Abel-Smith and Townsend in
their survey of living standards in 1968—69.
This applied, for example, to certain life assurance policies and property
settled otherwise than by the deceased, when the rest of the property did not
exceed £10,000.Distribution of Wealth in Britain281
trusts.Inthispaper, we attemptto make more accurate
adjustments, based on the National Balance Sheet data and with a
series of assumptions about the allocation of the missing wealth by
ranges.
C. Choice of Mortality Multipliers
The early discussions of the estate duty method demonstrated
clearlythatthe choice of mortality multipliers is of crucial
significance. (The overall multipliers used in the early estimates
ranged from 25 to 65, with corresponding variations in the
estimate of total personal wealth.) It is, therefore, important to
examine the sources from which the multipliers are derived and
the consequences of alternative assumptions. The Inland Revenue,
following earlier investigators, uses mortality multipliers adjusted
for social class (which is assumed to be correlated with wealth):
(1) for estates over £3,000, those relating to social classes I and II
(broadly the managerial and professional classes); and (2) for
estates under £3,000, rates midway between those for social
classesI and II and those for the population as a whole.8 The
relationship between these social-class mortality rates and that for
thegeneralpopulationisobtained byrelatingthedeaths
recorded for the years 1959-63 to the population at risk, as
enumerated in the Census of Population of 1961. This procedure
suffers from a number of drawbacks; in particular, from the fact
that there are serious discrepancies between the occupational
statements at death registration and those at the Census. This has
led Revell to reject this source and to adopt the alternative
approach of using the mortality experience of life assurance
offices as a basis for deriving estate multipliers (as used in the
United States by Lampman InSection II, this question is




method is that those dying in a given year may be regarded as a
representative sample of the living population. This assumption is
8Thedivision has been made at £5,000 since 1970.282A.'B.Atkinson
clearly open to question, and there are a number of reasons why it
may lead to biased estimates of the size distribution. In particular,
those with poorer health (and shorter life expectancy) are more
likely to have taken steps to reduce their estate duty liability than
others in the same age-sex group. The effect of such action
depends on the form which avoidance takes.9 In certain cases,
such as the deathbed purchase' of agricultural property (which
bears a lower rate of duty), the full value of wealth is still reported.
in the estatestatistics; in others, the effect of avoidance has
already been discussed under the heading of missing wealth (e.g.,
settled property). One method which may ,lead to biased esti-
mates, however, is the dispersion of property through gifts inter
vivos (which are exempt from any tax if the donor lives for a
further seven years). If both donors and recipients had the same
life expectancy as others in their age-sex group, gifts would not
lead to any understatement, since the wealth would appear in.the
estates of those recipients who died in a given period. However,
there are good reasons to doubt whether this is likely to be so. As
it was put by Lampman: "...itmight seem reasonable to assume
that persons, particularly at older ages, with shorter than average
life expectancy for their age group, would be more likely to be
donors than those with .longer expectancies" ([7], p. 68n). There
is no firm evidence to support this view, but it appears highly
plausible. If itis correct, and if gifts are made largely by the
wealthy(toavoidduty),thenthe degree of inequalityis
understated, although it is very difficult to make any estimate of
the likely magnitude of this effect.' °
In addition to the difficulties arising from the method by which
the sample is selected, there are the problems of sampling error.
Forcertainclasses,particularlythe largestestates and the
youngest age groups, the number of cases is extremely small: in
1969—70, for example, only one man leaving an estate of over
£200,000 died between the ages of 35 and 45. The Inland
Revenue has attempted to reduce the error involved by: (1)
Evasion of estate duty is not taken into account here. As is pointed out
by Revell: "most people would probably agree that this is at a low level in
Britain—if only because the legal methods of avoidance are so many" ([10],
p.112).
10Afactor working in the opposite direction is that where the donor dies
within seven years, the gift is included in his estate and hence may be' counted
twice.Distribution of Wealth in Britain283
combining the observations for the largest wealth groups for a
number of years to produce a smoother series; and (2) in the case
of other wealth groups, combining observations across age groups
and applying a combined multiplier. The rationale for these
adjustments is far from obvious. The reason for concern is not that
errors may be introduced through variation in the total number of
deaths in a particular age group, since this would be reflected in an
exactlyoffsetting variationinthe mortality multiplier. The
problem arises with the distribution of estates among wealth
classes. This suggests that any combination of observations before
applying the multipliers should not be between age groups (which
would introduce errorsarising from variationin the overall
mortality rate for each group) but between estate classes. In view
of this, the Inland Revenue approach is not followed here and no
adjustment is made for sampling error apart from the grouping of
estate classes.
E. Method of Valuation
The valuation of assets in the estate data was discussed by
RevelI ([10], Chap. 4) in the context of National Balance Sheets,
and he concluded that "in the valuation of items for estate
duty is just what we need—a valuation at market prices." He does
not, however, bring out the ambiguities involved in such a
definition for certain types of asset.' 1Hisown interpretation is
framed in terms of valuation on a "going concern" basis, but in
the case of household goods (for example) this could be very
different from the price obtainable on the secondhand market. It
may therefore be helpful to distinguish between a "going concern"
value and a realization value (through sale or borrowing power). It
is not clear which of the bases would be more appropriate for
our purposes,'2 and although we shall consider only the former
("going concern" value), ideally both should be examined.
One classof assets where the problems of valuation are
particularly acute is that of life policies and pension rights. In the
estate duty statistics, life assurance policies on the deceased's own
life are valued at the sum assured, whereas, in the hands of the
This passage owes a great deal to Kathleen Langley's perceptive
comments.
12Ido notagree with Langley thatarealization basisisclearly
preferable.284A. B. Atkinson
living, they are worth less than this amount (even as a "going
concern"). On the other hand, annuities may not appear at all, and
the rights to occupational pensions are not included apart from
any death benefit (and, in certain schemes, this may be held in
trust). On a realization basis, no allowance should be made for
pension rights (since one cannot in general borrow on the strength
of these rights), and in the case of life policies the appropriate
valuation—as has been suggested by Langley [5] —is the surrender
value. However, Revell has pointed out that these methods of
valuation are "inappropriate for the holder viewed as a 'going
concern'.-..Forthis there is no alternative but the present value
of the future income stream or capital payment." In what follows,
this method of valuation is adopted as far as possible. In the case
of life policies and funded pension schemes, it is based on the
total value of life and pension funds; in the case of unfunded
pension schemes, the valuation is necessarily more approximate.'
The detailed basis for the estimates is discussed further in Section
II. The methods followed parallel those of Revell in his work on
the National Balance Sheets, but there is the additional problem of
allocating the assets by ranges of total wealth.
Summary
The most important problems connected with the Inland
Revenue approach have been outlined above,'4 and Table1
summarizes the main differences between its treatment and the
approach adopted here. As will be clear, this paper is particularly
concerned with the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions
made, and it is hoped that it will provide a guide to those areas
where further research is most needed.
13Noaccount is taken here of the value of rights to state pensions or
other state benefits. This follows earlier studies.
14Anumber of other problems have not been discussed, such as that
stemming from the fact that estates only appear in the statistics with a delay
(see Langley [51, pp. 2—3). It is assumed here that estates coming to the notice
of the estate duty office in a given tax year relate to deaths in the preceding
calendar year (the same assumption as that made by the Inland Revenue), but
this is not entirely satisfactory.Distribution of Wealth in Britain285
TABLE 1Comparison of Methods
Inland Revenue Approach Adopted Here
A. IncompleteEstates not coming All adult population included
coverage ofto notice of Estate Wealth of missing adults
estates Duty Office are estimated from:
omitted (1) National Balance Sheet
data (Section II)
(2) Extrapolation of wealth
distribution (Section III)
B. incompleteNo adjustments made Adjustments using National
coverage of Balance Sheet data and as-
wealth sumptions about allocation
by ranges (Section II)
C. Mortality Based on Census of Alternative approaches based
multipliersPopulation data on Census of Population and
life office data (Section II)
D. Sampling Age groups are No adjustments made to basic




E. ValuationNo adjustments made Adjustments to a "going
concern" basis (Section II)
II. NEW ESTIMATES FOR 1968
A. Choice of Mortality Multipliers
The choice of the multipliers to be applied to the estate data is
clearly of central importance, and it is surprising that no attempt
has been made to assess the sensitivity of the results to the
assumptions made. In this section, we examine the two main
sources of data—the Census of Population and the life office
mortality investigation—and the differences in the results ob-
tained. As can be seen from Table 2, the mortality rates vary
considerably. The first two columns show the rates used by Lydall286A.B.Atkinson
TABLE •2Social-Class Mortality Rates as Percentage of General Mortality
Rates





Social Classes I and II
Life Office Data
.








25-34 75.5 72.6 72.9
35-44 74.2 72.4 68.3
45-54 80.6 76.9 69.7
55-64 83.7 83.7 66.8





SOURCES: Lydall and Tipping [6], Table A; Revell [101, Table 5.4;. Registrar
General for England and Wales, Census 1961: Decennial Supplement, Occupational
Mortality (H.M.S.O), Table 3A(i).
a This data has been adjusted; see text.
and Tipping, whose approach has been followed by the Inland
Revenue, and the rates derived from the census of 1961; the third
column shows the life office data used by Revell. The differences
are particularly marked in the case of those aged 45 and over, the
life office mortality rates being 20 percent lower in some cases.
The Census of Population data suffer from a number of serious
shortcomings for the purpose at hand:
1. As noted earlier, the data on deaths and on the population at
risk are obtained from different sources, and there are major
discrepancies between the occupational statements in the two
sources. This has been demonstrated in successive censuses by
special matching exercises, which in 1961 showed that only 63
percent of men were assigned to the same occupation unit on both
occasions, and that the social class differed in 17 percent of cases
surveyed. The Registrar General himself commented that "the lack
of agreement between the occupation given at census and that at
death reduces considerably the reliability of the analysis....theDistribution of Wealth in Britain287
net discrepancies ... areso large that the mortality estimates must
be affected by them."
2. A substantial number of people (7 percent) were recorded as
"unoccupied" in the Census but very few were so recorded at
death (0.5 percent). As a result, the mortality rate for all social
classes is overstated, particularly at older ages.
3. The analysis of female mortality does not include widows.'
4. The use of the Census data is based on the assumption of a
high degree of correlation between social class and wealth, but this
association is clearly far from perfect.
In their estimates for 1954, Lydall and Tipping made allowance
for point 1 by reducing the estimates of "upper class" mortality
by the percentage overrecording indicated by the matching study;
and made approximate adjustments for point 2 by allocating the
unoccupied proportionately toallsocialclasses. The Inland
Revenue has followed them in making this adjustment but
otherwise has used the data as it stands.'6
Revell considered the deficiencies of the Census data so serious
asto renderit"quite useless" for the derivation of estate
multipliers and he accordingly rejected it in favor of the life office
data.Thislatterisderived from the Continuous Mortality
Investigation, based on the mortality experience of life offices in
the United Kingdom and covering those accepted for ordinary life
and endowment policies at standard rates of premium. As Revell
points out, this source is attractive in that the population is known
throughout, so that there is no problem of incorrect classification.
He also argues that those holding life assurance policies are likely
to be representative of wealth holders appearing in the estate duty
returns, since life policies are subject to estate duty.'
Thereare, however, two major difficulties with the life office
data: the problem of "selection" by health and the inadequate
coverage of female lives. The first stems from the fact that
Relatedto this point is the variation in mortality rates with marital
status; see Smith [11].
16Itshould also be noted that the Inland Revenue makes no allowance
for differential trends in mortality over time, and that it maintained the
£3 ,000 division in applying the social-class multipliers throughout the 1 960s,
despite the fact that the number of estates above this level approximately
doubled.
17Industrialbranch claims are largely paid without probate, but these are
not covered by the Continuous Mortality Investigation.288A. B. Atkinson
acceptance for life assurance at standard premiums depends on
evidence of health. As a result, the data do not cover those
excluded on account of illhealth and hence the social-class
multipliers are biased upwards. The likely extent of this bias is
discussed by Revell and he makes corrections covering those
excluded from the life office data. The only light which can be
thrown on the second problemisthe Continuous Mortality
Investigation of male and female annuitants, which indicates that
for the older age groups the ratio of female to male mortality is
broadlythe sameasthatfor the general population. The
assumption that this is true for all ages is adopted by Revell,
although he describes it as "definitely faute de mieux."
From this brief discussion, it is clear that neither the Census
data nor data derived from the Continuous Mortality Investigation
are ideal for our purposes. Instead of making any attempt to
weigh up the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two
sources, the procedure followed is to consider the results obtained
with the following range of assumptions:
1. Assumption A 1.Social-class multipliers based on the Census
data adjusted in the same way as Lydall and Tipping (as employed
by the Inland Revenue)
2. Assumption A2. Social-class multipliers based on the life
office data (using the mortality ratios given in [10],Table5.4) for
estates of £3,000 and over, general mortality multipliers below
this level
3. Assumption A3. General mortality multipliers
The multipliers described above have been applied to the estate
data for 1968.' 8(Thechoice of this year was based on the
availability of data required to make the balance sheet adjustments
described below.) Table 3 summarizes the results for assumptions
Al, A2 and A3 covering the adult population, where adult is
defined as 18 and over.'
18Thebasic estate data and a number of supplementary analyses were
made available by the Inland Revenue Statistics and Intelligence Division, and
I am very grateful to them for their assistance with the investigation. They are
not responsible in any way for the use to which the data has been put.
1Any definition of the adult population is essentially arbitrary, but 18
was chosen on the grounds that it is both the age of majority and likely to
correspondtotheaverageageatwhich children become financially
independent of their parents. The use of 18 may be compared to that of 15
by the Inland Revenue, 20 by Lydall and Tipping, and 25 by Daniels and



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first difference between the results concerns the proportion
of the population not covered by the estate duty returns. The
"missing" population ranges from 61 percent with the general
mortality multiplier to.56 percent with the social-class multipliers.
The results for assumptions Al and A2 are in fact very close and
suggest that the proportion not covered is unlikely to fall below
50 percent on any assumptions. The second difference concerns
the shape of the upper part of the distribution. In general terms, it
appears that the use of social-class multipliers (as opposed to
general multipliers) leads to a lower estimate of the share of top
wealthholders. Comparing assumption Al with the general
mortality case (A3), the share in total personal wealth of those
above £200,000 is higher, but the number in this group is also
increased. Figure1 shows that the net effect is that the Lorenz
curve for assumptions Al and A2 lies inside that for assumption
A3, and that with social-class multipliers A2, the share of the top
1percent may be31/2percentlower than with the general
mortality multipliers.
If we turn to a comparison of the two social-class multipliers,
the differences are less marked: in terms of the share of the top 1
percent, for example, the difference is some 1percent of total
wealth. This difference is perhaps surprisingly small in view of the
substantial differences in the multipliers for certain age groups. It
should be noted that the differences between the two estimates
are largest in proportionate terms at the top wealth levels (the top
one-half percent and above) and that the life office multipliers give
considerably higher estimates of the number of top wealth
holders:




B. Relationship to Balance Sheet Data
Theestimates of personal wealth derived from the estate
statistics are, as we have seen in Section I, deficient in three major
respects: the property of "small" wealth holders is not covered,
certain types of wealth (such as settled property) are excluded,
and certain assets are not valued in an appropriate way (such asFIGURE!:
pension
Upper Part of Lorenz Curve With Multipliers A1-A3
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0
rights). These deficiencies cause the estimates of personal
wealth derivedby blowing up the estate data to fall considerably
short of those reached by National BalanceSheet methods. The
existence of the deficiencies may be illustrated by comparing the
estimated holdings of government liabilities for which the totals in
issue are known. All figures are in millions of
Distribution of Wealth in Britain
2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5
Percentageof wealth holders (from top)292A. B. Atkinson




Savings bank deposits 2,8783,0392,489 4,040
Even with the life office multipliers, the estimates for these assets
fall considerably short of the known totals and adjustments are
clearly necessary.
The relationship between estate duty estimates and National
Balance Sheet totals was discussed by Revel! with particular
reference to1 961. In that year, the estimate of total personal
wealth made by him on the basis of estate data was £63.9 billion,
whereas the corresponding balance sheet total was £77.6 billion.
The main sources of this discrepancy are shown in Table 4.
Although the assets and liabilities listed there do not exhaust those
for which there were discrepancies, they account for the main part
of the difference; and in what follows, attention is focused on
thesecategories.Itmust, of course, be recognized that the
discrepancies may arise as much through errors in the balance
sheet totals as through inadequacies of the estate duty estimates.
In certain cases, the balance sheet totals for the persona! sector are
obtained as residuals and the divergence from the estate estimates
may simply reflect errors in the totals for other sectors. In view of
this, the policy adopted here has been to make adjustments only
to those assets where there is an a priori reason to expect wealth
to be missing from the estate duty estimates. In the case of quoted
company shares, for example, there was no clear reason for the
discrepancy between the estate duty estimates and Revell's figures
obtained from register surveys, and no adjustment is made here.
Moreover, it should be noted that the balance sheet totals used in
this study are, in nearly all cases, classified by Revell as A (very
reliable) or B (fairly reliable). It must, however, be borne in mind
that the balance sheet totals quoted in Table 4 correspond to
values at December 3 1, whereas the estate duty estimates are a
weighted average for the year as a whole. If the value of assets is
rising, then the discrepancy can be partly explained in this way. In
view of this, the balance sheet totals have, wherever possible, been
20Ineach case allowance has been made for nonpersonal holdings. The
total is an average for the year.Distribution of Wealth in Britain293










Unquoted U.K. government 3.4 4.2 1
Savings bank deposits 2.9 3.2 2
Building society deposits 3.6 3.1 3
Household goods, etc. 2.1 4.0 4
Trade assets 2.2 4.4 5
Exempt settled property 0 1.4 6
Expectant interests 2.5 0 6
Quoted U.K. thares 12.1 13.9 7
Unquoted U.K. shares 3.1 5.4 7
Life policies and pension rights 7.2 13.5 8
Land and buildingsa 13.0 19.8 9
Liabilities:
House mortagages 1.2 4.9 8
Debts 2.9 4.9 10
Net worth 63.9 77.6
SOURCE: Revell 1101 ,Table7.1. This excludes holdings by overseas residents.
aTheliability "other deductions from landed property" is subtracted from this item.
based on a weighted average of the figures for different dates in
the year.2 1
Bearingthese points in mind, we may use the balance sheet
totals to make adjusted estimates for 1968. The first stage involves
the construction of balance sheet totals; the basic method follows
that of Revell and is described in the appendix. The second stage is
one not undertaken by Revel! and involves the allocation of
missing wealth by ranges. In this allocation, two main factors are
taken into account. First, in certain cases the nature of the asset
suggests that it is likely to be held in certain wealth ranges: for
example, those types of property covered by the Administration
21Theweights employed correspond to the proportion of deaths in each
period.294A. B. Atkinson
of Estates Act. Secondly, in a number of cases the discrepancies
arise through differences in the method of valuation (e.g. physical
assets) and the procedure followed is to increase the holding in
each range by an appropriate factor. For this purpose,itis
necessary to know the asset composition by wealth range, and use
is made of unpublished tabulations provided by the Inland
Revenue. Even allowing for these two factors, however, itis
necessary to make a number of assumptions, and the practice
followed has been to make four types of assumption:
1. Assumption Bi. No adjustment
2. Assumption B2. Lower bound to inequality—where wealth
is allocated as far as reasonable to lowest wealth groups
3. Assumption B3. A central estimate—inevitably arbitrary but
a "best guess"
4. Assumption B4. Upper bound to inequality—where wealth
is allocated as far as reasonable to upper wealth groups
The precise assumptions are described in greater detail in the
appendix.22
The results obtained with these four assumptions in the case of
the Census of Population multipliers are shown in Table 5. It is
immediately clear that the outcome differs considerably according
to which assumption is made: for example, the share of the bottom
group ranges from 3.4 percent (no adjustment) to 13.2 percent
(adjustment B2). Where the wealth is allocated as far as reasonable to
the lowest wealth groups (B2), the effect of the adjustment is to shift
the Lorenz curve inward at all points; but in the upper-bound case
(B4), the Lorenz curve shifts outward at all points above £1,000.
In the case of the central estimate (B3) the Lorenz curve is shifted
outward for those in the top 0.5 percent and inward below this
level.If anything, the Lorenz curve for this case is closer to
assumption B2 than to assumption B4. In general, the results
suggest the critical importance of the allocation of missing wealth
by ranges and the need for further research designed to narrow the
bounds placed on the allocation.
Table 6 shows the results obtained with the central assumption
B3 and the range of mortality multipliers Al. through A3. We
should expect that where the multipliers applied are lower, larger
22One further difficulty which should be mentioned here is that the
adjustments for missing wealth may change the ranking by size of holding. No
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adjustments will be required to bring the estate data into line with
the balance sheet totals. This is borne out by the results, which
show thatthe share of those below £1,000 isincreased by
considerably more in the case of the general mortality multipliers
than for assumption Al, and that the same holds true when one
compares Al with A2. The general effect is to shift the Lorenz
curves closer together. This may be seen by comparing the share of
the top 1.9 percent (A2) and the top 2 percent (A3). Before the
adjustment the differenceis3.8 percent, but afterwards it is
narrowed to 1.2 percent.
In the results described above, no adjustment has been made
for real property, for which the estate duty total falls considerably
short of the balance sheet estimates. As is explained in the
appendix, this difference reflects in large part the method of
valuation, and it may therefore be interesting to see the results of
increasing the estate duty estimates for this item proportionately,
so that they are in line with the balance sheet figures (see Table 7).
The Lorenz curve is clearly shifted inward at the top, and outward
at the bottom, reflecting the fact that real propertyis held
disproportionately in the middle ranges.
The adjustments described above have been based on very
limited evidence and a large number of assumptions, and it is
therefore important to consider the checks which can be made of
the reasonableness of the estimates presented here. The figures for





Assumptions Al and B3
Asshown
Table 6





























total personal wealth provide one such test. Although there are at
present no balance sheet totals to provide a benchmark for 1968,
we may examine the relationship between the estimates given
here, the balance sheet totals for earlier years and the Inland
Revenue figures (see Table 8). This suggests that the balance sheet
totals in the past varied between 130 percent and 150 percent of
the Inland Revenue total.Since the Revell/Roe figures were
derived using the life office multipliers, we should expect the total
to be closest in the case of assumption A2, and this is borne out
by the results in Table 8. A second check on the plausibility of the
estimates is to consider the implied average wealth of those not
covered by the estate duty returns:
Per capita wealth
Assumption B2 Assumption B3Assumption B4
Assumption Al 395 275 69
Assumption A2 343 245 66
Assumption A3 437 302 65






1960 72.0 51.6 140
1961 77.4 54.9 141
1962 85.6 58.3 147
1963 92.4 63.7 145
1964 94.9 71.8 132
1965 102.8 74.3 138




A2 Life office123.9 88.0 141
A3General 111.8 88.0 127
SOURCES: Column (1) from [13], column (2) from Inland Revenue Statistics, 1970
and 1972.
a Including adjustment for land and buildings.Distribution of Wealth in Britain299
Bearing in mind the conditions under which property may be
transferred without probate (see page 279), and allowing for an
average valuefor consumer durables and so on, the central
assumption does not seem unreasonable.
III. THE SHAPE OF THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
The estimates presented in the previous sections provide some
evidence about the shape of the wealth distribution in Britain, and
in this section we take a preliminary look at how far it may be
represented by a specific distribution function.23 Thereare two
main reasons for being interested in this question: (1) in the
absence of complete information about the distribution, we may
wish to use a fitted distribution to fill the gaps in our knowledge;
and (2) we may wish to test theories of the generation of wealth
which lead to predictions about the shape of the distribution.
In the former case, reference has already been made to the
extrapolation of the data derived from the estate returns to cover
lower wealth ranges. In the past, this extrapolation has often been
made by eye, a procedure which is to a large extent arbitrary. As
pointed out by Brittain "about the only solid reed Lampman had
to lean on below the top 1 .6 percent was his eye for a beautiful
curve" ([14],p. 6). As an alternative,Brittain suggests the
estimation of an explicit wealth distribution function and refers
particularly to that proposed by Champernowne. This method,
however, is only superior to that of Lampman if two conditions
are met: (1) it provides a satisfactory fit to the upper tail; and (2)
there are a priori grounds for supposing that the function provides
a reasonable characterization of the lower part of the wealth
distribution. The former is an obvious requirement, but the second
is equally important, and unless it is satisfied we may simply be
replacing a beautiful curve by a beautiful formula.24
23A more detailed study of this question is at present in progress and will
be the subject of a later paper.
24In addition to the extrapolation of the distribution to lower wealth
ranges, we may also be concerned about the problem of interpolation. The
distributions given earlier are based on grouped data, and it is not, in general,
possible to compare points on the Lorenz curve: for example, in order to
estimate the share of the top 1 percent, interpolation is required. In the past
interpolation has frequently been based on graphical methods, but the Inland
Revenue [15] has apparently used a specific distribution function (the Pareto300A.B. Atkinson
The requirement that there be a priori grounds for supposing
that the distribution is of a particular form leads naturally to the
testing of theories of wealth generation. The theories which have
been put forward are of two main types. The first group consists
of those which regard the distribution as the outcome of a Markov
stochastic process. Such theories have been advanced in the case of
wealth distributions by (among others) Sargan [16], Wold and
Whittle[1 7],Steindl[1 81andShorrocks[19]. Without
considering the plausibility of the assumptions made by these
authors, we may simply note here that the models are capable of
generating a range of asymptotic distributions (see Table 9).
Secondly, there are theories which regard the distribution as
essentiallydeterministicinnatureandattachparticular
distribution), and if conditions 1 and 2 described above are satisfied, this may
well be preferable.
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NOTE: F denotes the distribution function, f denotes the density function. W
denotes wealth. N denotes the normal distribution. W(J and F(, are constants.Distribution of Wealth in Britain301
importanceto economic and social forces. These have received
very little attention, and reference is made only to the work of
Stiglitz [20], as extended by the author [2l1,which shows how a
range of equilibrium distributions may be generated as a result of
thepracticeofprimogeniture.2The comparisonofthe
distributions predicted by the two groups of theories with that
actually observed in Britain cannot necessarily be expected to
allow us to discriminate between them, but it may well provide
indications of the directions which further research should take.
There are a number of different methods which could be
adopted to estimate the parameters of the distributions under
consideration and to judge their goodness of fit, and these have
been discussed by Quandt [24]in the context of measuring
industrialconcentration.For thepresent, attentionwill be
confined to the very simplest graphical methods, but in view of
the obvious deficiencies they should only be regarded as a
preliminary "sorting" procedure. The data to be employed is that
given in Table 3. There are two reasons for choosing these data
rather than the adjusted data of Table 6: (1) the fitting of a
distribution function is an alternative method of estimating the
wealth of the "missing" population; and (2) the adjustments made
in Table 6 mean that the data would have to be regrouped by
ranges if conventional procedures were to be 6
Pareto(Type I) Distribution
Although use of this distribution is hallowed by tradition, there
is remarkably little evidence in its support: the only British data,
for example, referred to by Wold and Whittle is that relating to
estates for 1907—11. A straightforward graphical test of the Pareto
distribution is obtained from the fact that log 1/(1—F)=alog
(W/W0).Figure2 shows the data in this form for the range
£1 and suggests that a Pareto distribution with
approximatelyequalto1.6couldprovideareasonable
representation of the upper tail (above £25,000). Below this level,
25Foran interesting analysis, comparing this assumption with the case
where wealth is divided equally at death and discussing the role of marriage
patterns, see Blinder [231. This model is not listed in Table 9 since it leads to
no definite predictions about the shape of the wealth distribution.
26Wealso confine our attention to the multipliers Al; the results for A2








FIGURE 2: Graphical Test of Pareto Distribution
however,it is clearlyinadequate, and even its strongest supporters
would not want to claim that it could be used to extrapolate the
wealth distribution downward. By the same token, the value of a
does not provide a good index
Log-normal Distribution
of the overall degree of inequality.
This distribution was found by Sarganto providea good
approximation to the British data for 1911—13, 1924—30, 1935—38
and1946—47. The same method of estimation(usinglog
0
3 4
W 1 510Distribution of Wealth in Britain303
probability paper)is used in Figure 3 for the 1968 data.27 This
suggests that the log-normal may give a reasonable fitin the
middle ranges, but there are systematic deviations from linearity at
the top and the bottom. Given the finding that the upper tail is
approximately Paretian, we could not expect the log-normal to fit
well to large wealth holdings and this is borne out by the excess of
27SeeAitchison and Brown 125], Section 4.5. The straight-line













frequencies above £100,000. At the lower end (below £5,000)the
deviations may well be explained by underrecording or missing
estates, and it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the
log-normal might provide an adequate fit to the lower part of the
distriu ion.
If we are seeking a distribution to provide a reasonable fit to the
whole range, then we need to find a distribution combining a
Pareto tail at the upper end with a shape closer to log-normal in
the middle ranges. In addition we need to consider the lower tail.
The Pareto distribution assumes a positive lower limit and the
log-normal assumes that W > 0; whereas, in fact, some fraction of
the population have negative net worth. One distribution which
may go some way toward meeting these requirements is that given
by:28
I —F=(1 —F0) [i ÷ (w/w0)iI]a. (I)
Thereisno straightforward graphical method of fitting this
distribution, but we may make some assessment of its possibilities
by considering the following special case.
The Sech2 Distribution
In the special case where a =1and F00, we obtain the sech2
distribution (which is also a special case of the Champernowne





whichprovides a convenient graphical test. From Figure 4, it can
be seen that the distribution provides a quite good fit to the data
overtherange Althoughtherearestill
systematic deviations from linearity, the curvature is less marked
than in the Pareto case and there are grounds for being more
confident that it can be extrapolated to the lower ranges. As in the
case of the log-normal, there are discrepancies in the ranges below
28Fordiscussion of this distribution, see Burr [281. In an unpublished
paper, a somewhat similar form was proposed and applied to income data by




Graphical Test of Sech2 Distribution
500 1,000
the estate duty limit ,000),but thesemay be explainedby
underrecording.
Table 10 shows the results obtained if the log-normal and. sech2
distributions fitted to the rangeabove £5,000 are extrapolated
downward to cover the whole distribution. It is clear that the
resultsusingthe two distributionsarequitedifferent. The
log-normal estimates indicatethat some £5billionmust be
added to allow for those not covered by the estate duty re-
turns, which is £1
sumption
billion less than the amount added on as-
B3, using the balance sheet approach. On the other
hand, the sech2 estimates suggest that the amount added should
Log (1
3 4 5 6306A.B.Atkinson





Total wealthbillion) 95 109
Total wealthaccordingtoestatedutyestimates
bjllion)a 90 90
a Corresponding to the distribution given in Table 3.
be £19 billion, which is higher than any of the assumptions B2
through B4. Itis probably fair to say that neither distribution
gives particularly reasonable results. The log-normal distribution
attributesverylittlewealthtothosenotcovered by the
distribution2and the mode is somewhat implausible, but the
location parameters of the sech2 appear to err in the opposite
direction.
Summary
As emphasized earlier, the primitive techniques employed here
do not allow any definite conclusions to be reached about the
relative merits of different distribution functions.Itisclear,
however, that the estimates derived using fitted distributions to
extrapolatefromtheuppertaildependsensitively on the
particular functional form adopted. Further research is needed to
allow us to discriminate more finely between the alternative
distributions (including ones not discussed here, such as the Pareto
type II and the Yule distributions). Without this, the usefulness of
fitted distributions in filling the gaps in our knowledge will be very
limited, anditwill not be possible to throw light on such
questionsastherelativeimportanceofstochasticand
deterministic factors in leading to the concentration of wealth.
29Itis interesting to note that the Gini coefficient (.80) is approaching
that calculated on the assumption that the excluded population have no
wealth at all.Distribution of Wealth in Britain307
IV. COMPARISON WITH THE OFFICIAL ESTIMATES
In this section, we compare the results obtained here with the
official Inland Revenue estimates. The correct method to be used
for such a comparison is open to The Inland Revenue
chooses to summarize its results in the form of Gini coefficients,
but as argued elsewhere [1 21, this has little apparent justification,
and it seems preferable to adopt the time-honored approach of
comparing points on the Lorenz curves. In order to present the
results in this form, interpolation is, in general, necessary. The
method used in the first part of the section is to take a log-linear
interpolation of the Lorenz curves,3 °butthe alternative approach
using fitted distributions is also discussed. In comparing Lorenz
curves, it is conventional to take the top 1 percent, 5 percent, 10
percent, and so on, but since we are particularly concerned with
the top of the distribution, it seems more helpful to focus on the
top 0.5 percent, 1 percent, 2.5 percent, and 5 percent. The top 10
percent, for example, extends as far as those worth £5,000, which
is not exactly the kind of figure one has in mind when considering
top wealth holders.
Table 11 shows the Inland Revenue distribution (expressed in
terms of the total population aged 18 and over) and the adjusted
estimates made here, and allows us to assess the contribution made
by different adjustments. First, we may compare the Inland
Revenuefiguresandthoseobtainedusingthe Census of
Population multipliers without any corrections for sampling error.
As was pointed out in Section I, the rationale for the particular
adjustments made by the Inland Revenue is unclear; and in the
present study, we have not followed them in combining age groups
and smoothing across years. The effect of the adjustments will
vary from year to year, but it is clear that in 1968 they served to
reduce the share of top wealth holders (comparing lines 1 and 2).
If we continue with the Census of Population multipliers, the next
main set of adjustments are those to allow for missing wealth.
With the central assumption B3, this involves the addition to total
personal wealth of £12 billion (not including the adjustment for
land and buildings). Of this, £6 billion is allocated to those not
covered by the estate duty returns (an average of £275 per head)
and £1.2 billion to those with recorded estates of under £10,000.
30Thisis equivalent to assuming that a Pareto curve is fitted to each pair
of points.308A. B. Atkinson
TABLE 11Comparison of Results
(percent)
Share in Total Personal
Top Percentages of
Adult Population
0.5 1 2.5 5
1.Inland Revenu&' 24.933.147.259.3
2.Census of Population multipliers (no
other adjustments) 26.534.948.560.5
3.Life office multipliers (no other
adjustments) 25.733.847.659.7
4.General multipliers (no other adjust-
ments) 28.136.850.963.3




8.Log-normal distribution fitted to Census
of Population data (unadjusted) 21.930.043.656.1
a The estimates given in Inland Revenue Statistics, 1972, expressed as a percentage of
total population aged 18 and over.
As a result, the share in total wealth of those with recorded estates
above £10,000—broadly the top 4 percent—is reduced, but at the
same time the distribution within the top 4 percent becomes more
unequal, so that the share of the very rich is actually increased (see
line 6). In Section III, we explored the alternative approach of
using distributions fitted to the upper wealth ranges to estimate
totalpersonalwealth, and thepredictedshares,using the
log-normal distribution, are shown in line 8. (The use of a fitted
distribution also avoids the need forinterpolation.) This method
makes no allowance for the missing wealth of the rich and, for this
reason,we shouldexpectthedistributiontoappearless
concentrated.Moreover, we haveseenthatthelog-normal
distribution does not provide a good fit to the upper tail. When
these considerationsare borne inmind, theresults for thew
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log-normaldistribution provide broad support for the earlier
estimates.
One of the main aims of the investigation is to examine the
sensitivity of the results to different assumptions; and in this
paper, we have concentrated on two important aspects: the choice
of multipliers and the allowance for missing wealth. The analysis
of the paper suggests that the results are likely to be particularly
sensitive to the latter factor. The range of variation is illustrated
by the fact that the share of the top 0.5percentincreases by
nearly 7 percent if we move from assumption B2 to assumption
B4 (see lines 5 through 7 of Table1). In the same way, if a fitted
distribution is used to extrapolate the distribution to cover the
lower wealthranges,theresultsdepend sensitively on the
functional form adopted. The choice of multipliers, on the other
hand, appears to make less difference to the shares of upper
wealth groups. The adoption of life office multipliers in place of
the Census of Population multipliers used by the Inland Revenue
would, for example, reduce the share of the top 0.5 percent by
only 0.8 percent (compare lines 2 and 3 in Table 11), and the
difference would be even smaller after the adjustment for missing
wealth.
APPENDIX: ADJUSTMENTS USING BALANCE SHEET DATA31
A. Unquoted U.K. Government Securities
The totals in issue are known from official statistics. In most
cases, the assets are owned exclusively by persons: the only major
exception is tax reserve certificates, where nonpersonal holdings
have been estimated extending the method applied by Roe [13].
The total is a weighted average of the December 1967, June 1968,
and December 1968 figures.
The main reasons for the discrepancy between the estate duty
estimates and the balance sheet totals are (I) the exclusion of
small wealth holders; and (2) the understatement of holdings of
those covered by the estate duty returns (particularly those below
the exemption level). On the basis of a special analysis of death
claims for 1960, Revell concluded that about 40 percent of the
For further details see the forthcoming monograph, The Distribution
of Wealth in Great Britain.310A.B.Atkinson
excess wealth should be allocated to the excluded population.32
However,since that date, the limit for probate has been increased
from £100 to £500. In view of this, the assumptions made are
those set out in Table 12 (assumption B 1 is that no adjustment be
made).
B. Savings Bank Deposits
The totalsinissue are known from officialstatistics and
personal holdings are obtained in the same way as for unquoted
government securities. The allocations by ranges is made under the
same assumptions as unquoted government securities.
C. Building Society Deposits
The total deposits are known from the issuing body, and again
nonpersonalholdingsaresmall(about 1percent). Personal
holdings are estimated using the same method as Roe and averaged
over the December 1967, June 1968, and December 1968 figures.
According to Revell's estimates for 1960, the value of deposits
involved in estates not appearing in the estate data is likely to be
small ([10], pp. 168-69). Since that data the Administration of
Estates Act 1965 has increased the limit below which probate is
not required and the amounts involved may be larger. At the same
time, the proportion allocatable to the excluded population is
probably smaller than in the case of unquoted U.K. government
securities and savings bank deposits, and the assumptions shown in
Table 12 reflect this.33
D. Household Goods, Etc.
The balance sheet totals given by Revefl and Roe are based on a
perpetual inventory method, and those used here are obtained in
the same way. The total is an average of the December 1967 and
December 1968 figures.
The difference between the balance-sheet and estate-duty
estimates arises in this case because of the exclusion of small
32See[1O],pp. 168—69.
The reasons why the holdings appearing in the estate data may be
understated include, for example, the fact that accrued interest may not
always be credited where the estate is clearly not dutiable.Distribution of Wealth in Britain311
estates and because of the adoption here of a "going concern"
basis for evaluation. The natural assumption under B2 is that the
first factor accounts for the whole of the difference, although in
certain situations the amount allocated per head would exceed the
average for those covered by the estate duty estimates, in which
case, the excluded population is allocated an amount equal to the
average holdings. For assumption B4, we take the extreme case
where the excluded population are allocated no part of the excess
wealth. For assumption B3, we take the intermediate case where
the average holdings of the excluded population are taken to be
equaltothe average for the range in the estate
estimates (approximately half the average for the estate statistics
as a whole). In each case, the remaining excess wealth is attributed
tothe differenceinthe method of valuation and allocated
proportionately to holdings (including those of the excluded
population).
E.Trade Assets
The balance sheet total for this item, which relates to the assets
of unincorporated businesses, is obtained by Revell using a quite
different method fromthçestatedutyestimates,andhis
approach is followed here (see [101 ,pp. 141—4). The total is an
average of the December figures. The main reason for the
differences in this case is the adoption by Revell of a "going
concern" valuation, and in view of this, the excess wealth is
allocated proportionately to holdings.
F. Exempt Settled Property and Expectant Interests
Any adjustment for missing settled property isnecessarily
speculative, since no really firm evidence is available about its
extent;itis,however, possibleto make some approximate
allowance. A starting point is provided by the estimates of Revel!
that in 1961 the amounts involved were:
million)
Property settled on surviving spouse 1,250
Discretionary trusts 200
Property settled on minors 200





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These estimates may be on the low side. In the case of discretion-
ary trusts, Revell himself commented that "many people who have
practical experiences of settled property would claim that the
figure...isfar too low," and he goes on to say that "undoubtedly
an enquiry on similar lines taken today [1967] would yield a
much larger figure because corporate trustees all report a great in-
crease in this form of trust ([101, p. 138)." The estimates made by
earlier investigators were indeed considerably higher. Campion's
figure for the settled property missing from the estate duty esti-
mates in 1936 was between £750 million and. £1,300million
([3], p. 21). In 1954, Lydall and Tipping assumed that discretion-
ary trusts accounted for £1 ,000 million and "settledproperty"
(presumably that covered by the surviving spouse exemption) for
£3,000 million.
It is hoped that in the course of the research being undertaken,
it will be possible to provide more definite evidence abOut settled
property,34 but for the present we consider a range of estimates
based on the earlier studies. A lower figure is provided by the
estimates of Revell and an upper one by those of Lydall and
Tipping, in each case extrapolated to The central estimate
lies in the middle of this range and represents broadly the same
percentage of wealth as that estimated by Campion [31.
million)
B2 B3 B4




Property settled on minors
Itseems reasonableto assume that much of this missing
property should be allocated to the higher wealth ranges. The
investigations by Revell ([101 and [26]) provide some guide in
this respect. It is assumed that all wealth in discretionary trusts
and trusts settled on minors belongs to those with wealth of over
£50,000, and that this should be allocated in proportion to wealth
Amongthe questions which need further consideration is the correct
method of valuing an interest in settled property.
The extrapolation of the lower figure is based on the indications given
by Revell ([101, p. 169) and that of the upper figure on the assumption that
settled property has increased approximately in proportion to total wealth.Distribution of Wealth in Britain315
inexcess of this amount as indicated by the estate duty estimates.
Property settled on a surviving spouse may be held lower down the
scale and is allocated in proportion to wealth in excess of £5,000.
There are two further problems concerning settled property.
First,the inclusion of "expectant interests" involves double
counting and this itemisexcluded. Second, the adjustments
described in the previous two paragraphs may involve double
counting if, at the same time, we are using the national balance
sheet estimates to correct for missing wealth. In order to overcome
this,itis assumed that the net addition of settled property
(allowing for the exclusion of expectant interests) is distributed
among different assets in the way shown below (which is based on
the estimates in [10], Table 6.2):
(percent)
Land and buildings 10
Quoted U.K. government securities 15
Quoted U.K. ordinary shares 70
Life policies
G. Quoted and Unquoted Company Shares
In the case of unquoted shares, the adjustment made by Revell
was designed primarily to give a smoothed series over a number of
years. Since the problem of sampling errors has already been
considered, no further adjustment is made here. In the case of
quotedsecurities,Revell obtained information from register
surveys about personal holdings and used these estimates in place
of the estate duty figures. As he comments "the reasons for the
apparent errors... areby no means clear" (apart from the settled
property already taken into account) and in view of this no
adjustment is made here.
H. Life Policies and Pension Rights
There are three main problems which arise under this heading.
First, the estate duty estimates of sums assured under life policies
exclude a number of items, including death claims paid with
production of probate (industrial branch claims), death benefits at
the discretion of trustees, policies securing loans (e.g. for home
purchase) and nonaggregable policies. Second, the method of316A.B.Atkinson
valuation—sums assured—is not appropriate. Third, no allowance is
made for the value of rights to occupational pensions apart from
the death benefits. In order to deal with these problems, Revell
replaces the estate duty figure by an estimate of the life funds and
of the value of unfunded pensions rights, and the same approach is
adopted here, with the total being a weighted average of the
December figures.3 6
Inallocating the missing items from the estate estimates,
industrial branch policies are allocated to the excluded population;
death benefits are allocated in the same way as pension rights (see
below); policies securing loans are ignored on the grounds that we
are not concerned with the asset composition of wealth (and the
corresponding adjustment to mortgages is similarly ignored); and
nonaggregable policies are allocated proportionately to wealth
indicated by the estate duty estimates. The allocation of pension
rights can only be based on guesswork in the absence of any firm
information about the distribution of the value of rights. It does
not seem implausible, however, to suppose that the rights would
be distributed across wealth ranges in much the same way as life
policies, and this forms the basis for the central assumption.3
Thelower bound is based on the assumption that rights are
equally distributed among all male wealth holders; and the upper
bound on the assumption that rights are distributed in proportion
to total wealth as indicated by the estate duty estimates.
I. Land and Buildings
The balance sheet total for this item is derived primarily by
multiplying up the ratable values (as an index of rents), and the
figures used here are an extrapolation on the same basis (the total
beingaweightedaverageoftheDecemberfigures).The
balance sheet total is quite substantially higher than the estate
duty estimate. Itis not reasonable to suppose that this excess
should be allocated to the excluded population since, according to
Revell, it is unlikely that estates containing dwellings would be
omitted from the Inland Revenue statistics. Part of the. difference
can be explained by the understatement of holdings of these assets
36Anallowance is made for the policies held by personal trusts.
For individuals, there may be a negative correlation between life
insurance and pension rights (one being a substitute for the other); however,
when we consider ranges of wealth, itis likely that they are positively
correlated.Distribution of Wealth in Britain317
byunincorporated businesses and partly by the omission of trusts,
but these are unlikely to account for the whole difference, which
must reflect in particular the method of valuation. As Inland
Revenue has pointed out, the estate data values separate interests
in a property and the sum of separate interests may be less than
the value for the property as a whole taken in the balance sheet
total. On the other hand, the estate valuation is closer to a
realization basis than to the "going concern" basis adopted here.
In view of this, estimates are presented both with and without the
adjustment to the balance sheet total.3
8
J.Debts (Apart from House Mortgages)
The balance sheet total for this item is constructed by Revell
largely on the basis of information available from other sectors,
and in the present case the same approach is followed.
The discrepancy between the balance sheet value and the estate
duty estimate can be attributed to the inadequate coverage of
unincorporated businesses, the netting out of debts when a life
policy is held, and the estates below the duty exemption level.
Revel! emphasizes the last of these factors and points out that
"when an estate is clearly not liable to duty, nobody has any
incentive to do elaborate sums to compute the debts owing by the
decreased and they will almost certainly be understated ([101, p.
159)." In view of this, it is assumed that the difference should be
attributed in large part to the excluded population and those
below the exemption level.
K. Allowance for Northern Ireland and Overseas Residents
The intention is to produce estimates for Great Britain, and we
must, therefore, remove the elements of Northern Ireland wealth
involved in the adjustments described above. This is assumed to be
achieved by reducing the balance sheet totals by 1.7 percent (the
percentage of U.K. personal wealth held by Northern Ireland in
1961). The adjustment for overseas residents has to be made to
the estate duty figures, since they include property situated in the
U.K. owned by overseas residents.39 According to Revel!, these
38Anallowance is made for land held in settled property; see F above.
Double-taxation relief usually means that duty is not paid, but the full
value of the assets will nonetheless appear in the statistics.318A. B. Atkinson
constituted between 1.4 percent and 2.1 percent of the gross
capital value of all estates of £3,000 and over in 1951—61, and
about 1percent of the estates below £3,000. The assumption
made is that 1 percent of estates below £5,000 and 2 percent of
estates above this level should be excluded.
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(April 1961): 171—85.DISCUSSION: WEALTH IN BRITAIN—THE
ESTATE DUTY METHOD REEXAMINED
Kathleen M. Langley
Boston University
Atkinson has made a masterly reappraisal of the estate duty
method of estimating the distribution of wealth in Britain. It is a
real advance to have subjected the two principal sources of error in
this method of wealth calculation to a sensitivity analysis. It has
long been appreciated by wealth calculators that a considerable
opportunity for error arises from inappropriate multipliers and
from the problem that decedents' reported estates may differ from
the current capital holdings of the living in the same age-sex
groups. It is, however, intriguing to learn that after the searching
review of the different mortality rates and of "missing" data,
conventional wisdom based on rule-of-thumb estimation is more
or less confirmed. What is long overdue is the task of selecting a
random drawing of living persons—and of their wealth—even if
only to reveal the inadequacies of deriving wealth estimates from
estate-duty tax returns.
The persistence of significant inequality in the distribution of
wealth in Britain despite the existence since 1940 of confiscatory
death duties does indeed suggest thateither the underlying
institutional forces making for inequality are particularly strong or
that measurement of the wealth distribution is inadequate. Hicks,1
in a recent examination of "equality" factors, points out that an
estate of £400,000 has today a real value of no more than
£100,000 in terms of 1939 pounds, and that since 1939 the rate
of tax on such an estate has risen from 20 percent to more than 60
percent. Moreover, during that time span, most estates will have
changed hands. As income and wealth are correlated, Hicks looks
at the change in the distribution of the personal incomes of
married persons (before tax) between 1954-55 and 1967-68 (in
terms of "1967 pounds"), and his estimates show a reduction in
the number of couples who fall into the top income group of
above £10,000 from 43,000 to 33,000 (a 23.3 percent drop). He
'J.R.Hicks, The Social Framework, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), Chap. XVIII, p. 246.
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concludes that "it can hardly be doubted that the fall in the
number of large properties, which is the result of death duties, is
one of the causes of the decline."2 He does, however, speculate
thatas more than half of income over £10,000 is "earned
income," a number of income earners who would otherwise be top
income earners have made arrangements to take income in a
nontaxable form. "Too great reliance on income taxation to
equalize incomes weakens the power of the income taxation itself
to do what it is supposed to do."3 It is possible that this is also the
situation with regard to estate duty taxation. Revell4 says that it
has become customary in Britain to call estate duty a "voluntary
tax" and to regard as "eccentric" an individual whose estate,
through his own neglect to take advantage of legal methods of
estate duty avoidance, does attract tax rates in the 60 to 80
percent range. The estate duty statistics must also be somewhat
"eccentric," and we may have reached a point when we can no
longer pretend that the estate duty statistics in any way represent a
random sample of the living population.
I should like to comment, first, on the forces making for wealth
preservation and on the problem of "missing" wealth; second, on
usage of National Balance Sheet data; and third, on other aspects
of the paper.
THE FORCES OF WEALTH PRESERVATION
The process of personal wealth generation and wealth transfer
has received inadequate study by economists. Atkinson refers to
two types of operational forces, namely, stochastic and deter-
ministic ones. Further discussion of the a priori assumptions
concerning the relative weighting of these respective forces within
a specific society would have been, I believe, both interesting and
pertinent in assessing the validity of his wealth calculations.
The economic and social forces making for both income and
wealth distributions of inequality may well exist in a not easily
disturbed.fashion in Britain. Stiglitz5 considers the main forces of
2Ibid.
Ibid., p. 249.
J. Revell, The Wealth of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), p. 110.
J. E. Stiglitz, "Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals,"
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wealth inequality to be (a) heterogeneity of the labor force in
terms of productivity, that is, I assume, in terms of acquired skills
or of given natural abilities; (b) class saving behavior; and (c)
primogeniture. A possible additional factor, namely life-cycle
saving behavior has been previously investigated for the British
case by Atkinson,6 who concluded that these differences were not
an important factor in explaining inequality. While primogeniture
may be of importance in Britain and also heterogeneity of the
laborforce—inthe words of George Bernard Shaw "Itis
impossible for an Englishman to open his mouth without making
some other Englishman hate or despise him"7 —I believe, that we
should consider category (b) not in terms of differential savings
ratios butinterms of social-classestate duty avoidance or
mitigation behavior. System maintenance is alleged8 to fall within
the domain of "grants economics" and one-way transfers or gifts
inter vivos have long troubled users of estate duty statistics for the
purposes of wealth measurement. Itis probable that although
wealth may indeed be unequally distributed, it is more equally
divided within a social group than is apparent from the statistical
estimates.
Gifts inter vivos pay estate duty today if made within seven
years of the death of the deceased. It has been assumed that the
question of these "gifts" can be ignored, because as has often been
pointed out, the recipients are also subject to the laws (or chances)
of mortality and such wealth may be counted twice in the
statistics. It has for some time been an article of faith to believe in
the above thesis and hence to accept the validity of the estate-duty
multiplier method of making wealth calculations. There have
always been legalgift exemptions: gifts made for public or
charitable purposes, or—of greater importance—"reasonable gifts"
shown to be part of normal expenditure if these should ever be
included in the estate. No attention has been given to the question
of responsibility for family expenses, that is, to the possibility that
gifts inter vivos may not be outright gifts—and thus liable to be
revealed in the unexpected death of a person in a young rather
6A. B. Atkinson, "The Distribution of Wealth and the Individual Life
Cycle," Oxford Economic Papers, July 1971. 'G. B. Shaw, "Preface to Pygmalion 1912," Prefaces by Bernard Shaw
(London: Constable, 1934), p. 771.
8K. E. Boulding, M. Pfaff, and J. Horvath, "Grant Economics: A Simple
Introduction," A merican Economist 16 (Spring 1972):21.324Kathleen Langley
than an old age group—but the taking over by more affluent
family members of expenses such as those for education or even
for vacations or normal living expenses. These "gifts" would, by
their very nature, be consumed by the recipient and never come to
the attention of the tax inspector, yet in a very real sense they per-
mit the buildup of human capital and of wealth potential to take
place and thus help to preserve the social class. Further, isit
reasonable to assume that tax inspectors question the payment of
possibly (over a period of years) quite substantial sums to wives
(or husbands) as normal living expenses—sums which are in effect,
capital transfers? In addition to exempt settled property and
discretionary and other trusts, significant sums could in this way
escape the tax collector.
THE USAGE OF NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET DATA
Atkinson's paper uses extrapolations of the National Balance
Sheet data on the basis of the estimates published by Revell in
1967 for the years 1957-61. It should be noted, however, that
these estimates of the value of a number of the assets owned by
the personal sector were made using the estate multiplier method.
Revell considered that he could correct for certain deficiencies in
the context of compiling an aggregate balance sheet for the
personal sector but he wrote, "We do not go into further
difficulties involved in trying to estimate the concentration of
personal wealth."9 Atkinson has been more ambitious and has
allocatedthe "missing" wealth to specific wealth ranges; his
assumptions appear to be based on good judgment—although, of
course, an allocation whichissimply proportional to estate
holdings necessarily compounds any initial misallocation by class
size.
The use of National Balance Sheet data means an acceptance of
the methods of valuation used in making the estimates. An
implicit assumption made by Revell is that of valuation based on a
"going concern" basis,thatis,thatalleconomic unitsare
continuingintheircurrentline of economic activity.This
assumption appears tobe entirelyappropriate at a national
level—but while the state lives on, individuals arrive and depart.
What matters to an individual is his command over resources at
Revel!, Wealth of the Nation, p.106.Discussion: Wealth in Britain325
any specific time. Both the poor and the very rich (at least in
Britain) have been called profligate—both groups spend what they
get, but the rich can afford to buy the services of tax lawyers, and
the lawyers see that their client's status is maintained. A life
interest in a trust means that provision is. made to obtain (1)
current purchasing power and thus command over immediately
available goods and services; and (2) the ability to pass along to
heirs entitlement to future goods and services. Trusts and the
ownership of corporations have shielded the wealthy from many
of the consequences of their spending follies. Insurance policies
provide additional protection and can be of a form that need never
appear in an estate. When a policy on the life of a person is owned
by someone else (often for large sums), particularly when business
interests are involved, an insurance company will pay out on a
death claim, but no estate will pay estate duty. The poor can and
do also obtain insurance protection, particularly for anticipated
funeral expenses—but itis highly probable that the traditional
weekly collection by insurance agents is a means whereby the poor
transfer a total "savings" sum to the insurance companies which
exceeds the benefits ultimately received. Such small policies do
not provide immediate liquidity to the holders; but on the other
hand, the wealthy can use their insurance policies to secure bank
overdrafts or other loans.
On a personal rather than on a national level, the "going
concern" valuation concept is not necessarily the most appropriate
one. Personal wealth consists largely of paper "claims" 0ofvarying
degrees of liquidity. In 1969, on the basis of Inland Revenue's
estimate of gross personal wealth (and—as the paper has pointed
out—this is an underestimate), quoted shares and debentures and
insurance policies alone accounted for 45 percent of the total. On
the other hand, household goods and "other personalty" formed
13 percent of the total. Paper claims to wealth and to command
over resources are not closely tied to either the flow or stock of
real goods and the realization value at any given time can fluctuate
for many reasons which are not associated with the productivity
In 1938, in an early and very searching examination of the concept of
national capital, Kuznets indicated that the "claims" approach to wealth
estimation was "especially suited to be the basis of distribution of wealth
among individuals." Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, Vol. 2
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938), p. 7.326Kathleen Langley
or real economic performance of a country. The interests of the
holders of paper wealth do not necessarily lie in the same direction
as the interests of the nation as a producer of real things. Carter
has recently put forward the view that Britain considered as a
"going concern" has suffered too often in the last twenty years
from undue attention being given to the interests of those people
who hold paper wealth.' 1Canwe assert that the "true" capital
value of a company on a given date is "correctly" determined by
the securities market, when itis known that the specialists in
specific stocks frequently encourage speculation? It is generally
accepted that the capital market is imperfect and many securities
may not be worth their going exchange prices in terms of the
present discounted value of future expected earnings—but we must
accept, when considering wealth in terms of its command over
resources, the view that "a thing is worth what you can get for
it"—either through outright sale or through its borrowing power.
Inland Revenue does attempt to abide by the above principle.
When, for example, the decedent has held an insurance policy on
the life of another person, the estate is charged to duty on the
surrender value of the policy. If an insurance policy is considered
as a current asset, its value must be what can be raised against it or
its current surrender value, even if the surrender value is computed
so as to impose a penalty on the act of surrender; the poor, with
few liquid, assets, pay heavily in order to obtain a little additional
immediate command over resources.: Further, I would not dispute
thatitis a reasonable procedure in a National Balance Sheet
context to take account of rights to funded or unfunded pension
schemes and, logically, also of social security retirement benefits.
Ultimately, the nation, considered as a "going concern," will have
to meet these claims to future consumption in some manner, but
if the value of these future "rights" is not at the current time
realizable by an individual, can they be considered as part of his
wealth? If these "rights" are included in the personal wealth
estimates, the actual distribution of realizable wealth holdings
becomes increasingly concealed. The provision of a pension by an
institution is one form whereby an individual can avoid complete
payment of current high income taxes; and as the need for
personal saving is reduced, so also is control over personal wealth.
Charles Carter,Wealth, An Essay on the Purposes of Economics
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), Chap. 5.Discussion: Wealth in Britain327
SOME OTHER MATTERS
Sampling Error
Atkinson prefers combining observations by estate ranges to
ensure a minimum sample size (p. 283) instead of following the
Inland Revenue procedure of obtaining 'a smoother series by
combining observations for a number of years. Neither procedure
is particularly satisfactory; the decision making is arbitrary, and
we can never be sure that the sample size is of minimum adequacy
when there is no particular principle that governs the selection of
estate class or age groupings.
Choice of Mortality Multipliers
If, as is very likely, the distribution of wealth in Britain owes
much to social and economic deterministic factors then itis
reasonable (despite an overall national trend of increased prosper-
ity and lower mortality) to attempt to differentiate the mortality
rates of wealth owners from those of the general public. The
characteristics of the ease of life which wealth makes possible are
likely to linger on over several generations and to reduce the
hazards of exposure to physically demanding occupations or to
occupations entailing a risk to health. Unfortunately, as is pointed
out in the paper, the precise relationship between the level of
social-class multipliers and the degree of wealth inequality is
unclear. It would, however, have been interesting to have heard
speculations concerning the not insignificant differences in the
estimated number of top wealth holders based on multipliers Al
and A2. The cumulative number of people with over £1 million is
17 percent higher using assumption A2 rather than assumption
Al, and the cumulative number of people with over £200,000 is
1 8 percent higher. Numbers are increased, but evidently per capita
wealth decreases and the Lorenz curve shifts inward. The result
must be related to the age and sex classification by estate grouping
but precisely in what manner?
Wealth Distribution Functions
Atkinson is undoubtedly correct in insisting that much further
research work is required before we can rely on a specific fitted328Kathleen M. Langley
distribution tofillthe gaps in our knowledge concerning the
overall distribution of wealth. Itis, indeed, only too easy to
substitute a beautiful formula for a beautiful "guesstimate." It
would appear, in particular, that attention should be given to the
problem of assessing the proportion of the adult population who
have zero or negative net worth. We do not know, either on
empirical or theoretical grounds, which of the many assumptions
that can be made should be considered reasonable. At present, an
assessment of the adequacy or inadequacy of any estimate of the
implied average wealth of those not covered by the estate duty
statistics is inevitably an arbitrary one.
On the question of the appropriateness of any particular fitted
distribution, the basic issue of the functional form should perhaps
be reconsidered. It is well known that an appropriate mathemati-
cal function to describe the actual frequency distribution of
wealth (or income) has been difficult to find. Partly because of
this problem, and partly because of Pareto's early discovery that
the tail end of the cumulative distribution is linear in the log-log
plane,thedistributionfunctionhas been preferredtothe
frequency function in most economic research—but most distri-
bution functions do not provide a description of the data over
more than a small region of interest. It is possible that further
research concerning the form of frequency function in addition to
that of the cumulative distribution would be rewarding and help in
theassessmentof therelativeweight of stochastic and/or
deterministic wealth-generating factors.
In conclusion, since the results presented by Atkinson indicate
that significant inequality of wealth persists in Britain, we might
ask whether the publication of wealth estimates does not indeed
encourage a continued search by the rich for new devices to ensure
the preservation of their status.